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 The city of New York has been initiating litigation to protect its interests for over 
a hundred years.  One of the older cases commenced by the city, which made its way 
to the United States Supreme Court, was brought in 1829.1  In that case, the city 
sued a ship owner under a state statute for the failure of the shipmaster to report to 
the mayor the name and description of passengers who had been brought to the city 
in the ship.2  The question before the Court was whether this statute was an exercise 
of the state’s police power to prevent the inf lux of paupers, or whether it was a 
regulation of commerce and therefore subject to the Commerce Clause.  In 1837, 
after hearing argument twice,3 the Supreme Court rejected the Commerce Clause 
challenge and upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the police power.4
 While Commerce Clause and immigration jurisprudence have changed 
significantly, immigration and public assistance are still important themes for the 
city’s affirmative litigation. 
 In 1982, Corporation Counsel Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. established the 
Affirmative Litigation Division in the Office of the Corporation Counsel in order to 
better focus on advancing the city’s interests through commencing litigation.5
 This article describes lawsuits litigated by the Affirmative Litigation Division 
on behalf of the city in the recent past, and divides those lawsuits into two broad 
categories.  In the first category, the city, like other business enterprises, sues to 
protect its financial or proprietary interests.  In the second, the city sues as a 
governmental actor, and here policy and politics play a more obvious role than in the 
typical commercial lawsuit.
I. CITY AS COMMERCIAL ACTOR
 In the commercial arena, the decision to sue is not at all mysterious.  The city 
enters into commercial relationships just like other entities, signing contracts and 
leases and owning property.  This “business” is run by the appropriate city agencies 
on behalf of the city.  When a problem arises under such a commercial arrangement, 
the agency’s commissioners, program staff, or general counsel seek Law Department 
help in enforcing obligations in accordance with the rules of commerce.  Enforcement 
mechanisms usually take the form of damages suits, so that the city can recover its 
actual loss and deter future misbehavior.  If private businesses know that the city will 
enforce its rights just like other businesses, they will be more likely to comply with 
contracts and leases.  Just like any other attorney, the Corporation Counsel is looking 
out for the client’s money, which in this case, is really the public’s money or the 
taxpayer’s money.  The following are some examples of commercial suits initiated by 
the city.
1. See Mayor of N.Y. v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
2. Id. at 130.  The statute required the commander of every ship from outside the state of New York 
arriving at the port of New York to give the mayor the information of every person on the ship, including 
his or her name, place of birth, last legal settlement, age, and occupation.  See id. at 130–31.
3. Id. at 106.
4. Id. at 132.
5. See Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Lawyers for Government Have Unique Responsibilities and Opportunities 
to Influence Public Policy, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 375 (2009).
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 A. Asbestos Litigation
 The city was one of the first municipalities to sue asbestos manufacturers to 
recover the cost of abating asbestos in schools and other public buildings.6  As the 
number of cases against asbestos manufacturers continued to rise, the city’s recovery 
efforts shifted to bankruptcy court and to the assertion of claims against trusts 
created by the bankruptcies.  When the Johns-Manville Corporation—the largest 
manufacturer of asbestos in the world—sought bankruptcy protection,7  Affirmative 
Litigation Division attorneys served on the committee that negotiated the plan that 
resulted in the first asbestos trust created to pay those injured by asbestos, including 
property owners such as cities and school districts.  The city also played a major role 
in the bankruptcies of other defendants, such as National Gypsum, Kentile Flooring, 
U.S. Mineral, Keene, and Celotex.  In fact, the city was the major claimant in the 
Celotex bankruptcy, which resulted in the creation of a trust of more than one billion 
dollars.8  Competition for this large pot of money was intense between personal 
injury claimants and property damage claimants, such as the city.  After the city 
received more than $11 million from the Celotex trust, the Celotex trustees, allied 
with personal injury lawyers, refused to pay the balance of the city’s claims.9  The 
city took the lead in litigation challenging the actions of the trustees and won 
repeatedly in the bankruptcy court.  The trust appealed, first to the district court 
and then to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  There, the court ruled 
largely in the city’s favor, resulting in an additional payment of more than $47 
million.10
 The city has thus far collected over $130 million from asbestos-related defendants 
and is the single largest recipient of asbestos bankruptcy recoveries.
 B. Insurance Litigation
 The city requires its contractors and permittees to procure insurance coverage for 
both themselves and the city.  A few years ago, attorneys in the Affirmative Litigation 
Division noticed that when the city and a contractor were sued in tort over an incident 
that arose in connection with the contractor’s work, the contractor would be defended 
6. See, e.g., City of New York v. Keene Corp., 505 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986), aff ’d, 513 
N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1st Dep’t 1987) (upholding causes of action for indemnity and restitution).  Discovery 
issues were litigated, see, e.g., City of New York v. Keene Corp., 756 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1st Dep’t 2003), as 
were issues of successor liability (compare City of New York v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 688 N.Y.S.2d 23 
(1st Dep’t 1999) (finding Pfizer not liable as successor), with City of New York v. Aaer Sprayed 
Insulations, Inc., 722 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dep’t 2001) (finding successor liability); see also City of New 
York v. Aaer Sprayed Insulations, Inc., 583 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1st Dep’t 1992) (declaring that the alter ego 
question is an issue of fact).
7. See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
8. See Asbestos Settlement Trust v. City of New York (In re Celotex Corp.), 487 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 
2007).
9. Id. at 1326–27.
10. Id. at 1327.  The court awarded the city $40 million without interest.
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by the insurance company, but the city would be left to defend itself.  To remedy 
that, the city has developed an insurance and declaratory judgment practice that has 
so far resulted in over $150 million in savings to the city.11  When there is a tort suit 
that arises in connection with the work of a contractor or a permittee, the city now 
tenders that suit to the insurance company and demands defense and indemnification. 
In this respect, the city is behaving just like any other commercial actor in identifying 
and protecting its rights, and is reaping substantial financial benefits as a result.
 C. Foreign Mission Tax Litigation
 In order to establish the validity of tax liens on portions of buildings that house 
consulates and missions to the United Nations, the city sued three foreign 
governments—the Republic of the Philippines, the Permanent Mission of India to 
the United Nations, and the principal Resident Representative to the United Nations 
of the Mongolian People’s Republic.  With respect to the Philippines, the city 
claimed taxes were due on portions of the property used for a restaurant, a bank, and 
an airline office.  With respect to India and Mongolia, the city claimed taxes were 
due on portions of the property used as residences for employees below the level of 
Head of Mission.  The case involved the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, customary international law, the 
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), New York common law, and New York 
Real Property Tax Law.12
 India and Mongolia moved to dismiss on the ground that they were immune 
from the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the FSIA.13  The motion was denied 
by the district court and affirmed by the Second Circuit.14  Corporation Counsel 
Michael A. Cardozo argued the case before the United States Supreme Court, which 
affirmed jurisdiction pursuant to the FSIA’s “immovable property exception” to 
11. See generally City of New York v. Evanston Ins. Co., 830 N.Y.S.2d 299, 301–03 (2d Dep’t 2007) (holding 
that where an endorsement provided coverage to the city only if the loss “is determined to be solely the 
negligence or responsibility of [the named insured],” and a stranger to the policy was held at least partly 
responsible for the accident, the city was still entitled to a defense, since it was “solely” the insured and 
not the city who was alleged to be liable); City of New York v. Zurich-Am. Ins. Group, 811 N.Y.S.2d 
773 (2d Dep’t 2006) (holding that where Zurich defended the city’s co-defendant bus company, but 
ignored the city’s requests for counsel, and the city settled the underlying tort case, Zurich could not 
challenge the reasonableness of the settlement even though the city’s answer was stricken in the 
underlying tort case); City of New York v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 805 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1st Dep’t 2005) (holding 
that there was no prejudice to the insurer due to the city providing a late notice of legal action where the 
insurer already had notice of suit from the named insured, was participating in the litigation, and had 
received a complaint against the city from its named insured); City of New York v. St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Ins. Co., 801 N.Y.S.2d 362 (2d Dep’t 2005) (holding that the insurer’s delay of more than four 
months in disclaiming coverage was unreasonable when the alleged basis for denying coverage was 
readily apparent).
12. See City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 376 F. Supp. 2d 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff ’d, 446 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2006), aff ’d, 127 S. Ct. 2352 (2007).
13. Permanent Mission of India, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 430.
14. Permanent Mission of India, 446 F.3d at 377; Permanent Mission of India, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 439.
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immunity.15  The Court held that a tax lien “inhibits one of the quintessential rights 
of property ownership—the right to convey.  It is therefore plain that a suit to 
establish the validity of a lien implicates ‘rights in immovable property,’” and falls 
within the exception to immunity.16  After the jurisdictional ruling, the district court 
granted the city’s motion for summary judgment validating the tax liens and assessing 
taxes against India and Mongolia, and as to the Philippines, assessing taxes on the 
premises except for the portion occupied by the restaurant.17  The total judgment in 
favor of the city exceeded $57 million.18
II. CITY AS GOVERNMENTAL ACTOR
 The city also initiates litigation in its capacity as a governmental actor.  Unlike 
the typical commercial lawsuit, these suits can easily reflect the policy preferences of 
elected officials, particularly the mayor.  The city has long brought suits to further 
the policy initiatives of the city’s chief executive and to implement and enforce policy 
initiatives enacted into local law by the city council.  As the examples below show, 
the interests of the city are often broadly construed in these lawsuits.
 A. Public Health and Safety Litigation
 First, the city has initiated regulatory litigation, as part of its mission to ensure 
public health and safety.  These cases include gun litigation, suits over cigarette 
taxes, and immigration issues.
  Gun Litigation 
 In 2000, the city brought suit against a group of gun manufacturers whose guns 
were recovered in New York City in connection with criminal activity.19  The suit 
alleged that the gun manufacturers knew, or should have known, that some of their 
dealers were disproportionately supplying the criminal market for guns through 
negligent or intentional sales practices,20 and that those practices created a public 
nuisance within the city.21  The suit was stayed after September 11, 2001 because the 
offices of the Corporation Counsel were closed, making case files unavailable.22  The 
15. Permanent Mission of India, 127 S. Ct. at 2358.
16. Id. at 2356.
17. City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 533 F. Supp. 2d 457, 469–70 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
18. City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 538 F. Supp. 2d 701, 704 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).  This decision, and the decision granting the city’s motion for summary judgment, 
Permanent Mission of India, 533 F. Supp. 2d 457, are currently on appeal to the Second Circuit as of the 
time of this writing.
19. See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
20. See id. at 284.
21. Id. at 276.
22. Id. at 262.
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parties were also awaiting a state appellate court decision on a suit brought by New 
York State.23  The state’s case was eventually dismissed.24  The city’s case, however, 
proceeded.25
 The city’s continued prosecution of this suit resulted in running battles with 
Congress, starting in 2004, over the use of data collected in a previously-public 
firearms trace database by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(“BATF”).26  In 2005, a few weeks before the trial date, President Bush signed the 
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which appeared to give the gun 
industry sweeping immunity from most tort lawsuits.27  When the defendants moved 
to dismiss the case under the statute, the city successfully argued that the suit fell 
within a statutory exception for actions that alleged a violation of state or federal law 
applicable to the sale of firearms.28  The defendants appealed, and the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in a two-to-one decision dated April 30, 
2008.29  The court held that New York Penal Law Section 240.45, the nuisance 
statute under which the city claimed the exception, is a statute of general applicability 
that does not expressly regulate firearms, has not been applied by the courts to the 
sale and marketing of firearms, and cannot clearly be said to implicate the sale and 
marketing of firearms.30  Therefore, the court concluded, the federal statutory 
exception does not encompass New York Penal Law Section 240.45.31
 In 2006, the city brought two public nuisance suits against twenty-seven gun 
dealers whose guns were recovered in connection with crimes in the city.32  The 
23. See People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep’t 2003).
24. Id. at 204.
25. See Beretta, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 286.
26. See generally City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 234 F.R.D. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that 
the 2006 Rider to the 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act does not deprive the court of jurisdiction); 
City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 517 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that the 2006 
Rider to 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act does not preclude the city from introducing data in its 
possession); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 228 F.R.D. 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that 
the 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act does not preclude BATF production of trace data), reh’g 
granted and aff ’d, 228 F.R.D. 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that the discovery order should have been 
complied with before the effective date of the 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act); Johnson v. Bryco 
Arms, 222 F.R.D. 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), aff ’g City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 51 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that the 2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act does not preclude BATF 
production of trace data pursuant to a subpoena and subject to a protective order).
27. See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
28. Id. at 261–64.
29. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, 
77 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2008) (No. 08-530). 
30. Id. at 399–400.
31. Id.
32. See City of New York v. Bob Moates’ Sport Shop, Inc., No. 06-CV-6504, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11699 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction); City of New 
York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying motion to dismiss for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction).
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litigation followed an undercover investigation targeting dealers whose guns were 
most frequently recovered in connection with New York City crime.  The lawsuits 
were recently resolved, with twenty-one of the defendant gun dealers reaching 
settlements with the city.  The settlements generally provide for a court-appointed 
Special Master to provide training and education, recommend stringent sales 
practices, and monitor the dealers to assure compliance.  The remaining defendants 
were either dismissed or defaulted.
  Cigarette Taxes
 The high tax on cigarettes sold in New York City gives rise to robust attempts at 
tax avoidance.  Many attempt to purchase untaxed, “bootleg” cigarettes over the 
Internet.  Internet sellers in a low-tax state will offer cigarettes stamped according to 
that state’s law, which, because of the negligible tax there, retail for far less than 
cigarettes sold in New York.  The cigarettes are mailed to New York Internet 
customers, who have paid the out-of-state price to the out-of-state Internet seller. 
Under the federal Jenkins Act,33 an out-of-state cigarette vendor selling to a New 
York buyer must report such sales to the New York tax authorities.  The New York 
tax authorities can then collect the New York use tax from the New York buyer, who 
is liable for the tax regardless of where the purchase is made.  In line with a major 
anti-smoking policy initiative by Mayor Michael A. Bloomberg and the Commissioner 
of Health, Thomas R. Frieden, the Affirmative Litigation Division brought several 
lawsuits seeking to stop the f low of untaxed cigarettes into the city.  One suit is 
against approximately thirty-five out-of-state Internet cigarette sellers under the civil 
Racketeer Inf luenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), based on their 
failure to file Jenkins Act reports, and on state law consumer fraud and public 
nuisance claims.34 After several defendants settled with the city, the case was 
dismissed against the remaining defendants but recently reversed on appeal.35  The 
New York Court of Appeals found that the city had standing to sue under RICO 
where it has alleged a direct injury of lost taxes inflicted on it by reason of defendant 
cigarette retailers’ alleged commission of mail and wire fraud through the sale of 
cigarettes to residents of the city without complying with the Jenkins Act.36
 Another suit was brought against the principal wholesalers of untaxed cigarettes 
to New York Native American tribes under the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking 
33. 15 U.S.C. § 376 (2006).
34. City of New York v. Cyco.net, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, City of New York v. 
Smoke-Spirits.com, 541 F.3d 425 (2d Cir. 2008).
35. Smoke-Spirits.com, 541 F.3d at 425.
36. Id.  The court also certified to the New York Court of Appeals two questions of state law: whether the 
city has standing to sue under the state’s General Business Law, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (McKinney 
2008), and whether the city may assert a common law public nuisance claim predicated on N.Y. Pub. 
Health Law § 1399-ll.  Smoke-Spirits.com, 541 F.3d at 457–58.
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Act (“CCTA”).37  The CCTA penalizes the sale and possession of untaxed cigarettes, 
provided the taxing locality has an “applicable” cigarette tax.38  Although New York 
wholesalers are permitted to sell untaxed cigarettes to Native American tribes for 
consumption by tribe members, they are not permitted to sell untaxed cigarettes to 
reservation retailers who re-sell the cigarettes to the public.39  The wholesalers moved 
to dismiss, claiming that New York State’s adoption of a “forbearance policy,” 
pursuant to which the state “forbears” from enforcing the legislative tax requirement 
and allows untaxed cigarettes to be sold to reservation-based retailers, made the 
CCTA inapplicable.40  The court recently denied this motion, finding that the New 
York statute requiring tax stamps to be affixed to all cigarettes includes those sold by 
reservation retailers for resale to the public, and that the state’s policy of “forbearance” 
or non-enforcement does not bar liability under the CCTA.41
 In addition, the city recently commenced litigation against eight cigarette sellers 
located on the Poospatuck Reservation in Mastic, Long Island, for selling massive 
quantities of cigarettes on which state and city taxes have not been paid, alleging 
violations of the CCTA and state law.42
  Immigration Issues 
 Various mayors have taken the view that there are public health and safety 
reasons, as well as fiscal reasons, to encourage so-called “undocumented” aliens—
people in the country without papers legitimizing their presence—to come “out of 
the shadows,” in particular to ensure that the aliens are willing to report crime to the 
police and seek necessary health care.43  In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) to provide legalization to those undocumented 
aliens who qualified and filed a timely application.44  The program had a one-year 
application period and was to expire on May 4, 1988.45  In 1988, the city, consistent 
with the policy view described above, joined with the state and a plaintiff class to 
challenge the regulations promulgated by the Immigration and Naturalization 
37. City of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 550 F. Supp. 2d 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).  The CCTA is 
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341–2346 (2006).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 2341.
39. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
40. Id. at 337–39, 344 n.2.
41. Id. at 348.
42. City of New York v. Golden Feather Smoke Shop, Inc., No. 08-CV-03966 (E.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 29, 
2008).
43. See generally Exec. Order No. 41 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://home2.nyc.gov/html/imm/
downloads/pdf/exe_order_41.pdf; Exec. Order No. 34 (May 13, 2003), available at http://search.citylaw.
org/isysquery/873c3005-348e-457c-8b7d-258626c0cae0/4/doc; Exec. Order No. 124 (Aug. 7, 1989), 
available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/library/queens/PDF_files/Orders/ord124.pdf.
44. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
45. Dep’t of Homeland Security IRCA Legalization Provisions, 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2.
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Service (“INS”).46  The statute provided that an alien had to demonstrate a history of 
employment evidencing self-support without receipt of public cash assistance.47 
However, the INS regulations expanded this by requiring the alien to demonstrate 
that his or her immediate family members also had not received any public cash 
assistance.48  The parties also challenged the INS’s failure to broadly disseminate 
complete and accurate information about the legalization program.49
 As a result of the suit, the INS revised its regulations and reevaluated all 
applicants who had submitted timely applications.50  The plaintiffs were unable, 
however, to persuade the court to extend the deadline for legalization applications.51
 Various mayors, starting with Mayor Edward I. Koch in 1989, implemented 
executive orders setting forth the city’s policy of protecting the confidentiality of 
information regarding aliens and encouraging them to use city services.52  In 1996, 
Congress passed two statutes, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act of 1996 (“Welfare Reform Act”)53 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“Immigration Reform Act”),54 which 
appeared to preempt the city’s authority under the executive order to prohibit city 
officials from transmitting information respecting aliens to the INS.  In furtherance 
of the city’s confidentiality policy, the city brought a facial challenge to these federal 
laws, which was unsuccessful.55
 B. Litigation over State and Federal Funds
 In addition to public health and safety litigation, the city, as a governmental 
actor, also initiates litigation against other levels of government over funding and 
revenues.  These fiscal suits often involve political and policy issues as well.  For 
example, the city has sued the state over funding for a wide variety of public programs, 
46. Perales v. Thornburgh, 967 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1992).
47. Id. at 801 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(iii) (2006)).
48. Perales, 967 F.2d at 802 (referring to 52 Fed. Reg. 16,209 (May 1, 1987) (codified as amended at 8 
C.F.R. § 245a.1(i) (1992))).
49. See Perales, 967 F.2d at 801 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(i) (2006)).
50. Perales, 967 F.2d at 814–15.
51. See Perales v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff ’d, 847 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying 
preliminary injunction); Perales v. Thornburgh, 762 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (upholding validity 
of INS public charge regulations), rev’d, Perales v. Thornburgh, 967 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated, 
509 U.S. 917 (1993) (vacating the decision in light of Reno v. Catholic Social Services, 509 U.S. 43 
(1993) and remanding Perales v. Thornburgh, 4 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1993) and Perales v. Reno, 48 F.2d 
1305 (2d Cir. 1995)).
52. Exec. Order No. 124, supra note 43.
53. Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21 and 42 U.S.C.).
54. Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
55. City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff ’d, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1115 (2000).
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including foster care,56 public assistance,57 Medicaid,58 correctional expenses,59 and 
the administrative costs of the federal food stamp program.60  However, any litigation 
against the state involves budgetary and political considerations that are broader than 
the particular public program at issue; the city is, after all, a political subdivision of 
the state and a creature of state law.  There may be legislative initiatives or negotiations 
over revenues between the city and the state that are unrelated to the program under 
consideration, but such political negotiations might influence the decision of whether 
to sue.  In addition, state agencies interpret state law or promulgate regulations that 
the city might view as inconsistent with statute, depending on the city’s policy or 
fiscal view of the matter.
 Policy—and money—also factor into deciding whether to sue for federal funds. 
The city’s policy regarding aliens, for example, prompted the city to challenge federal 
regulations that denied prenatal care coverage under Medicaid to certain aliens. 
Furthermore, because pregnant alien women who are ineligible for Medicaid may 
seek prenatal care at city-funded facilities, the city had a fiscal interest in ensuring 
Medicaid coverage.
 This Medicaid prenatal care coverage question was litigated in Lewis v. 
Thompson.61  This 1979 class action challenged the federal government’s regulatory 
interpretation of the Medicaid statute to deny prenatal care coverage to certain aliens 
who were not permanent residents or were not otherwise permanently residing in the 
United States under color of law.62  The plaintiffs also challenged a companion New 
56. See Sabol v. Perales, 82 N.Y.2d 685 (1993) (vacating state audit sanctions imposed on the city where the 
state ignored its own published interpretation of regulations); City of New York v. Johnson, No. 
400110/42005, N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3221 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Jan. 11, 2005) (holding that the state’s 
formula for allocating foster care block grant monies was arbitrary and capricious).  
57. See Gross v. Perales, 72 N.Y.2d 231 (1988) (holding that the city’s challenge to a $20 million penalty 
imposed for failure to comply with an unpromulgated internal state audit guideline could be heard in 
the New York State Supreme Court, as opposed to the court of claims, and that the New York State 
Supreme Court had authority to order incidental monetary relief); Flowers v. Perales, 565 N.Y.S.2d 504 
(1st Dep’t 1991) (holding that certain state audit standards were unpromulgated and therefore could not 
be a basis for penalty).
58. See Krauskopf v. Perales, 74 N.Y.2d 730 (1989) (upholding a state audit of the city where the state’s 
standard was reasonable); City of New York v. Wing, 783 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1st Dep’t 2004) (holding that 
the city’s claim that the state’s negligent programming of its computers caused the city to pay Medicaid 
benefits to ineligible persons must proceed in the court of claims), appeal denied, 4 N.Y.3d 705 (2005). 
59. See City of New York v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 655 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1st Dep’t 1997) (holding that 
the state must reimburse the city for inmates who have already been committed to state custody but are 
temporarily in city custody for open cases pending in city courts).
60. See City of New York v. Lawton, 515 N.Y.S.2d 903 (3d Dep’t 1987) (remanding a suit for reimbursement 
of food stamp administrative costs for determination of whether the state had good reason for delay 
when the state Division of the Budget stalled implementation and lobbied to retroactively amend the 
statute to deny reimbursement).
61. 252 F.3d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 2001).
62. Id. at 571–72.
501
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
York State regulation.63  The original lawsuit was brought against the city 
commissioner of the Department of Social Services, George Gross, as the local social 
services commissioner implementing state and federal law, along with state and 
federal defendants.64
 The Medicaid statute was subsequently amended.  When the plaintiffs next 
went before the district court, the caption had changed to Lewis v. Grinker, with 
William Grinker now the city commissioner of the Department of Social Services. 
However, the city had previously intervened as a plaintiff, joining the plaintiff class 
against the federal and state defendants.65  The Second Circuit affirmed a permanent 
injunction barring the denial of prenatal care to this category of aliens in what the 
court called “the extremely rare instance where we can discern a clearly expressed 
congressional intent contrary to the plain language of the statute.”66  After the 
enactment of the Welfare Reform Act in 1996, the federal defendants sought 
reconsideration of the injunction.67  Although the court agreed with the federal 
defendants that Congress had now made clear its intent to deny federally subsidized 
prenatal care to this category of aliens, it found that the denial of prenatal care to 
alien mothers violated the equal protection rights of their citizen children.68  On 
appeal, the caption finally changed to reflect the city’s role as a plaintiff-intervener, 
rather than a defendant, but that satisfaction was short-lived, as the Second Circuit 
reversed on most of the merits.69  However, the court did remand for a revised 
injunction that assured that the plaintiff class has the same automatic eligibility for 
their citizen children that is available to the children of citizen mothers.70  Even 
though the city and the other plaintiffs lost in the end on most of the substantive 
issues, the litigation ensured that the class of alien women involved received prenatal 
care under Medicaid for approximately fourteen years, from the time of entry of an 
injunction in 1987 until it was vacated in 2001.
 Similarly, the city’s policy regarding abortion factored into the city’s decision to 
challenge federal regulations under Title X of the Public Health Services Act.71  The 
city joined the state of New York and federally-funded providers of family planning 
63. Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (certifying class and granting summary judgment, 
finding no alienage restriction in Medicaid statute).
64. Id.
65. Lewis v. Grinker, 794 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting a permanent injunction against state 
and federal officials from denying Medicaid coverage for prenatal care to alien pregnant women who 
were not residing in this country under color of law); Lewis v. Grinker, No. CV-79-1740, 1987 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16780 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (granting a preliminary injunction barring the denial of Medicaid 
coverage for prenatal care to the same class); id. at *5 (referring to the city as plaintiff-intervenor).
66. Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1219 (2d Cir. 1992).
67. Lewis v. Grinker, 111 F. Supp. 2d 142, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
68. Id. at 185–86.
69. Lewis, 252 F.3d 567.
70. Id. at 591–92.
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300–300a-6 (2006).
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services to challenge these federal regulations, which prohibited Title X-sponsored 
clinics from providing nondirective counseling to pregnant clients about abortion 
and prohibited referrals to abortion providers.72  The regulations further provided 
that any Title X provider must both physically and financially separate any abortion 
services from the Title X family planning program.73  This challenge was ultimately 
unsuccessful.74
 The city has also joined advocacy groups challenging the Social Security 
Administration’s narrow interpretation of disability eligibility.  The decision of 
whether to litigate such issues depends both on how the city’s policy makers view the 
rights of the disabled and on fiscal considerations, since the city and the state have an 
interest in shifting eligible individuals from city and state funded public assistance 
programs to programs that are funded entirely by the federal government.
 These disability issues were litigated in Bowen v. City of New York75 and Stieberger 
v. Sullivan.76  In Bowen, the city, the New York City Health and Hospitals 
Corporation, two state officials, and plaintiff class members sued the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and the Social Security Administration 
(“SSA”), challenging their treatment of severely mentally ill applicants for benefits 
under the Social Security Disability Insurance Program and the Supplemental 
Security Income Program.77  The suit alleged that SSA had a covert policy of 
presuming that certain applicants had a residual capacity to work, rather than making 
an individualized determination of work capacity.78  The district court held that the 
covert policy was illegal and ordered the secretary to reopen the decisions denying or 
terminating benefits and to redetermine eligibility.79  The court also ordered interim 
benefits to all who had been terminated.80  The Second Circuit later affirmed the 
72. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179–80 (1991).
73. Id. at 180–81.
74. The Court held, among other things, that the regulations were a permissible construction of the 
underlying statute, id. at 187; that the government does not unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis 
of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program to advance certain permissible goals, such as non-
abortion family planning, id. at 193; that the regulations do not impinge on the doctor-patient 
relationship, id. at 200; and that if a state can constitutionally refuse to fund abortions (as already held 
by the Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989)), then a decision to 
exclude abortion-related services from a family planning program would surely be constitutional, Rust, 
500 U.S. at 202.
75. 476 U.S. 467 (1986).
76. 792 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
77. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 469–72.
78. Id. at 473.
79. Id. at 476.
80. Id.
503
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
district court,81 and Corporation Counsel Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. argued the 
case before the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed.82
 In Stieberger, the city and plaintiff class members again sued HHS and SSA to 
challenge their policy of “nonacquiescence,” pursuant to which SSA instructed its 
administrative law judges to disregard the decisions of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit if those decisions conflicted with the secretary’s own 
policies on whether an applicant is disabled.83  The district court certified the class 
and enjoined the nonacquiescence policy.84  On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated 
the injunction in light of a remedy that it had issued in another case, Stieberger v. 
Bowen.85  In 1990, the district court dismissed some claims on statute of limitations 
grounds and granted injunctive relief to the plaintiffs on other claims.86  In 1992, the 
court approved a settlement agreement,87 which was soon thereafter amended.88
 C. Litigation to Protect the City’s Power and Influence
 In addition to these public health and safety suits, and suits against other levels 
of government, the city as a governmental actor also may litigate in an attempt to 
protect its political power and influence.  For example, the city tried for over fifteen 
years to enhance the accuracy of the census count, which the city believed significantly 
undercounted urban residents who were members of minority groups or lived in low-
income neighborhoods.  A more accurate census would inf luence congressional 
apportionment for the state, influence the city’s numbers in the state legislature, and 
would affect federal funding under programs that allocate resources based in part on 
population.
 This litigation was started by Mayor Edward I. Koch as a plaintiff in a challenge 
to the 1980 census,89 was defended by Rudolph W. Giuliani during his tenure as 
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and it continued 
81. Id. at 477.
82. Id. at 487.
83. Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
84. Id. at 1400.
85. 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
86. Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
87. Stieberger v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
88. Stieberger v. Sullivan, 801 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
89. See Cuomo v. Baldrige, 674 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that state and city officials failed to 
prove that the Bureau of the Census’s decision not to adjust the 1980 census was unreasonable or 
arbitrary and capricious, and that the statistical methods proposed by the plaintiffs could not at the time 
be reliably used to adjust the census); see also Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), 
aff ’d, 637 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1980) (granting city and state officials a preliminary injunction ordering 
the Bureau of the Census to compare records and process additional forms); Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. 
Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (ordering the Bureau of the Census to use statistical methods to produce a 
more accurate census count than the unadjusted count and not certify New York’s population totals until 
there was compliance with the court’s order), rev’d, Carey v. Klutznick, 653 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1981).
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during Mayor Giuliani’s mayoral term as a challenge by the city and others to the 
1990 census.90  It spanned the tenure of six Corporation Counsels starting with 
Allen G. Schwartz.  When the suit began, Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. of Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore LLP was representing the city (and other parties in the case); he 
later became Corporation Counsel and continued to represent the city in that 
capacity.  When Peter L. Zimroth became Corporation Counsel, he came into the 
litigation and never left, remaining as special counsel to the city even after his tenure 
as Corporation Counsel was over.  The litigation came to an end in 1996, when the 
United States Supreme Court rejected the challenge in Wisconsin v. City of New 
York.91
 In addition to suits where the city itself is seeking to protect its power and 
influence, there are also cases where the mayor is seeking to protect or define his 
power and influence in relation to other city elected officials, often with respect to 
the city council’s assertion of power.92  Generally, the Corporation Counsel represents 
90. See City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 822 F. Supp. 906, 1124 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (upholding 
the Secretary of the Department of Commerce’s 1991 decision not to adjust the 1990 census), rev’d, 34 
F.3d 1114 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the arbitrary and capricious standard used by the district court 
was incorrect, and that the district court should have utilized the heightened scrutiny test applied in the 
one-person, one-vote cases to determine whether the secretary’s decision was “essential to the 
achievement of a legitimate governmental interest”), rev’d, Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 
19 (1996) (holding that the secretary’s decision not to adjust the 1990 census was not subject to 
heightened scrutiny and had to “bear only a reasonable relationship to the accomplishment of an actual 
enumeration of the population”); City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 739 F. Supp. 761 
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that the Department of Commerce and officials administering the 1990 
census fulfilled their obligations under a previously signed stipulation providing for the secretary to 
revisit the issue of adjustment and take advice from an expert panel); City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, 713 F. Supp. 48 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
91. Wisconsin, 517 U.S. at 1.
92. See Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 9 N.Y.3d 23 (2007) (requiring the mayor to bargain with unions 
representing fire alarm dispatchers and emergency medical technicians, rather than with unions 
representing the majority of employees city-wide after local laws conferred “uniformed” status on these 
employees, did not usurp the mayor’s powers); Council of N.Y v. Bloomberg, 6 N.Y.3d 380 (2006) 
(finding that the Equal Benefits Law, which prohibited city agencies from entering into contracts with 
entities that fail to provide employment benefits to domestic partners of its employees equal to those 
provided to spouses, was preempted by state and federal law);  Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 789 
N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2004) (finding that a 2001 council bill regulating apparel and 
related purchases by mandating wage and labor standards for contractors and others unlawfully curtailed 
mayoral powers by conferring additional contract-related powers on the comptroller and intruding on 
the mayor’s power to determine bidder responsibility); Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 780 N.Y.S.2d 
266 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2004) (finding that a 2002 council bill prohibiting the city from doing 
business with entities the council defined as “predatory lenders” was preempted by state and federal laws 
regulating banking and loans, and other state programs); Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 721 N.Y.S.2d 
39 (1st Dep’t 2001), rev’g 696 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999) (finding that a 1997 local law, 
whereby the council would “designate” two members of a five member investigatory board, but the 
mayor would retain the ultimate authority to make these appointments or to refuse to make the 
appointments until the proposed designees meet with his approval, unlawfully curtailed the mayor’s 
powers); Giuliani v. Council of N.Y., 688 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999) (holding that a 
1993 local law granting the council a veto over commuter van route approvals by the Taxi and Limousine 
Commission was inconsistent with the state’s Transportation Law and the charter, and curtailed the 
mayor’s powers); Council of N.Y. v. Giuliani, 679 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st Dep’t 1998) (giving priority to a 
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the mayor in these cases, and they typically arise when the mayor disagrees on a 
policy basis with the council and vetoes a local law, which then passes over his veto. 
It is also possible, however, that the mayor agrees on the policy issue, but has to 
defend the allocation of power under the City Charter, and he therefore might litigate 
over the validity of a local law even while agreeing with the policy it ref lects.
 Cases involving the allocation of power can either be affirmative cases brought 
by the mayor, or defensive cases in which the mayor defends his decision not to 
enforce a local law he believes to be invalid.  For example, shortly before the effective 
date of the Equal Benefits Law, Mayor Bloomberg began a declaratory judgment 
action against the council, asserting that the law was inconsistent with, and preempted 
by, federal and state law, and that it curtailed the Mayor’s powers.93  The Mayor 
sought a temporary restraining order against the law’s enforcement, which was 
denied.  City attorneys then informed the supreme court justice hearing the matter 
that the Mayor would withdraw his motion for a preliminary injunction and would 
move promptly for summary judgment, and that in the meantime, the Mayor would 
not enforce the Equal Benefits Law.  The next day, the city council initiated an 
Article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus to compel the Mayor and the city 
to immediately implement and enforce the Equal Benefits Law.  The Mayor then 
raised as a defense the same assertions he had raised in his declaratory judgment 
action against the council.  The New York Court of Appeals held that the Mayor 
was entitled to raise the invalidity of the law as a defense in the Article 78 proceeding, 
and that, while he had a duty to implement valid legislation passed by the city council, 
he also had a duty to comply with valid state and federal law.94  According to the 
court, where the mayor concludes that a local law conflicts with a state or federal law, 
the mayor’s obligation is to obey the latter, as the Mayor did in this case.95  The court 
then went on to hold that the Equal Benefits Law was preempted by state contracting 
law and by federal law.96
 These are but a few examples of the kinds of suits the Corporation Counsel has 
initiated on behalf of the city over the last twenty-five years.97  During that time 
mayoral charter commission proposal over the council’s effort to place a referendum on the ballot 
concerning the location of a new Yankee Stadium under the “ballot hierarchy” set forth in Municipal 
Home Rule Law); Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 651 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep’t 1997) (invalidating a 
1995 local law that established an Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board and vested in the 
council the right to appoint two members of the five-member board, because the Municipal Home Rule 
Law and the New York City Charter require a referendum when a local law transfers the power of the 
mayor to the council).
93. See Bloomberg, 6 N.Y.3d at 380 (2006).
94. Id. at 389.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 390–95.
97. The Affirmative Litigation Division is not the only division at the Office of the Corporation Counsel 
handling affirmative claims.  The Administrative Law Division commences affirmative regulatory 
cases under the Nuisance Abatement Law and litigated for years to close adult establishments.  See, e.g., 
City of New York v. Stringfellow’s of N.Y., 96 N.Y.2d 51 (2001).  The Commercial and Real Estate 
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period, the Office of the Corporation Counsel has interpreted the city’s interests 
broadly and has been willing to sue to vindicate those broad interests.  The city and 
its elected officials have been interested, not only in maximizing city revenue through 
commercial litigation, but also in litigating on behalf of the broader interests of the 
city and the public.
Litigation Division’s affirmative real estate unit brings a wide variety of affirmative litigation, including 
complex landlord-tenant proceedings, actions to enforce restrictive covenants, and actions to quiet title 
in cases of fraudulent transfer.  See, e.g., Office of the Corporation Counsel, New York City Law 
Dep’t, Annual Report: 2004–2005, at 17 (2005).  The Environmental Law Division has challenged 
several federal agencies for failing to regulate or for unlawfully regulating in response to harms, such as 
greenhouse gas emissions, that contribute to global warming, smog, and inefficient energy uses.  See, 
e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
